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Transnational Legal Ordering of Data, 
Disinformation, Privacy, and Speech 
David Kaye* & Gregory Shaffer** 
This symposium addresses the governance of digital privacy and speech in two 
ways. First, it assesses the impact of regulation in one area on issues outside of it. 
Second, it shows how regulatory processes are transnational in scope, involving 
different forms of transnational legal ordering. 
The symposium was held on September 11, 2020, marking the nineteenth 
anniversary of 9-11. Many readers will remember precisely where they were on that 
momentous day. In a strange way, 9-11 brought people around the world together, 
at least for a moment. Yet 9-11 occurred just before the world of connectivity 
changed in massive ways. It was only five years or so before the creation of 
YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook. So much has changed since 9-11, including the 
nature of information and how we share it, risks to privacy, challenges to 
democracy, and contestation over the ownership of data. We are pressed to think 
in new ways about the implications of regulation of information, privacy, and 
speech both domestically and transnationally, and how these different substantive 
areas interact. 
Processes of transnational legal ordering begin with struggles over the framing 
of a problem that actors wish to be ordered through legal mechanisms.1 That is the 
case with the issues of data privacy and speech in the broader global context. Is the 
problem to be defined in terms of individual privacy protection? Of social access to 
information? Of the integrity of political processes in light of disinformation 
campaigns? Of property rights and innovation? Of the free flow of data? Or 
otherwise? The framing of the problem shapes legal norms to address relevant state 
and non-state practices. Struggles over defining it implicate what is and what is not 
ordered through law.  
 
* David Kaye is Clinical Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
** Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law. We thank 
my research assistant and the Editor-in-Chief of the journal, Allyson Myers, as well as the other journal 
members for their work. 
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Lawmaking occurs at multiple levels, from the international to the regional to 
national and sub-national levels. It involves both public lawmaking and rulemaking 
by private actors, including by companies creating and operating social media 
platforms. It encompasses both the extraterritorial application and impact of 
national law, and the deterritorial development and application of private 
rulemaking. Transnational legal ordering comprises the development, resistance, 
interaction, settlement, and unsettlement of these norms across different levels of 
social organization. Rulemaking by private bodies can feed back into shaping the 
understanding of public law, just as public law shapes private rule application and 
practice. There are, in short, multiple sites for the propagation of norms. What 
becomes “law” involves the dynamic development of norms across these sites, 
involving diagnostic struggles over the nature of the problem as well as recursive 
processes between public and private norm making and practice at different levels 
of social organization.  
Take for example the area of trade law and the promotion of the “free flow” 
of data by the United States.2 There are clashes of interest and ideological struggles 
among nation-states and private actors. Many trade lawyers, especially in the United 
States, focus on the liberalization of the digital economy and thus of data flows. 
They are concerned about the rise of data nationalism and the raising of border 
walls against data flows. These legal struggles affect the ability of companies to 
innovate, to develop an “Internet of Things,” and to improve performance. In 
opposition to this framing of the problem are those concerned with surveillance 
capitalism and the surveillance state that accumulate and use data to control us.  
Very different templates for legal ordering are developed in competition with 
each other. Those pressing for a world of free data flows aim to develop a 
transnational legal order that ensures it. The European Union, in contrast, has 
developed a transnational legal order protecting data privacy, first within it, and then 
through exporting its legal norms transnationally as a condition for companies to 
access, transfer, and use personal data gathered from within the European Union. 
Other large developing countries, such as India, Indonesia, and Brazil, rather are 
interested in China’s model of data nationalism, which has given rise to huge 
Chinese companies that have exclusive access to data within China’s borders. These 
countries want to generate their own national “champions” in the digital economy. 
In parallel, national security and foreign policy concerns rise in prominence, as 
reflected in U.S. concerns over TikTok and WeChat and concerns regarding foreign 
interference in national elections. These concerns provide a new frame for assessing 
how to regulate the digital economy. In each case, issues are viewed within different 
lenses, shaping a legal response, which, in turn, implicates other social concerns.  
 
2. Gregory Shaffer, Trade Law in a Data-Driven Economy: The Need for Modesty and Resilience, 
WORLD TRADE REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
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Huge corporations, having assets greater than the gross domestic product of 
many states, create their own standards and interact with governments. Given the 
challenges for reaching global agreement, civil society organizations engage directly 
with companies, often placing countervailing pressure on them in response to 
pressure they receive from governments, which corporations must navigate. Many 
political communities see problems as beyond the reach of public processes. 
The concept of transnational law was made famous in a series of “Storrs 
lectures” given by Philip Jessup in 1956 at Yale Law School.3 Jessup coined the term 
transnational law to address the need for problem-solving at a time of cynicism 
during the Cold War regarding the prospects of international law and international 
organizations. Interestingly, Jessup himself was a victim of the Cold War as the U.S. 
government wished to have him appointed to the International Court of Justice, 
but McCarthyites within Congress accused him of being a Communist and blocked 
his designation. Jessup derived the concept of transnational law with the aim of 
supporting new governance arrangements at a time when international institutions 
were largely dysfunctional. 
This symposium begins with Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for 
Speech and Privacy by Joris van Hoboken and Ronan Ó Fathaigh. Their article 
addresses the interaction of privacy and speech implicated by the regulation of 
“disinformation” in the European Union. 4  The authors categorize European 
disinformation regulation into four areas: (1) access to platform data, reflected in 
regulation requiring platforms to share data with academics for research purposes;5 
(2) content-based restrictions on disinformation, reflected in laws prohibiting the 
manipulation of election-related information;6 (3) law enforcement cooperation, 
reflected in laws regarding the reporting of misleading internet content to 
authorities; 7  and (4) the “pseudo-militarization” of disinformation regulation, 
implicating foreign policy.8  
The authors examine the implication of these regulations for freedom of 
speech. Given the vagueness and subjectivity of the definition of “disinformation” 
under the law, the authors find that “public officials have great latitude in the type 
of content that may be labelled disinformation,”9 leading to potential censorship of 
 
3. Gregory Shaffer & Carlos Coye, From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law, from 
Transnational Law to Transnational Legal Orders, in THE MANY LIVES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW: 
CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH JESSUP'S BOLD PROPOSAL 126, 126 (Peer Zumbansen, ed., 2020). 
4. Joris van Hoboken & Ronan Ó Fathaigh, Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for 
Speech and Privacy, 6 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 9, 11 (2021). 
5. Id. at 16–17. 
6. Id. at 17–20. 
7. Id. at 21–22. 
8. Id. at 20–23. 
9. Id. at 24. 
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lawful information. Disinformation regulation typically involves increased online 
monitoring and surveillance,10 providing governments with access to user data.11  
The article notes the potential of EU data protection law to confront 
disinformation by requiring transparency and consent to the processing of personal 
data.12 This potential is important because “disinformation campaigns may involve 
the use of profiling of audiences with regard to their susceptibility to being misled 
by certain communications.”13 The data-driven profiling of audiences for purposes 
of disinformation can be addressed, in part, the authors contend, through data 
protection laws. 
The authors develop an alternative for the future of European regulation, 
pointing to the European Democracy Action Plan. The Plan aims to combat 
disinformation through measures more in line with international human rights 
standards. It would, for example, fund projects to support “deliberative democratic 
infrastructures,” strengthen “media freedom and media pluralism,” and empower 
citizens “by strengthening media literacy.”14 
evelyn douek’s article The Limits of International Law in Content Moderation 
responds to the call for social media platforms to implement international human 
rights principles as standards for speech-related decision-making, such as content 
moderation. Observing that social media companies have been eager to “jump on 
the bandwagon”15 of international human rights compliance, douek maintains that 
platforms are willing to do so at least in part because international human rights 
principles do not provide a real constraint on their activities.16 While douek is 
sympathetic to the proposition that international human rights law (IHRL) offers a 
useful framework for social media platforms in regulating content while respecting 
freedom of speech, she critiques this position. 17  She finds that failing to 
acknowledge the limits of IHRL in constraining the activity of social media 
platforms serves to legitimize corporate practices, without benefiting social media 
users.18  
douek’s article examines how social media platforms benefit from coopting 
the language of international human rights. Human rights discourse, she contends, 
provides social media platforms with legitimacy—similar to what Daniel Berliner 
 
10. Id. at 25–26. 
11. Id. at 26–29. 
12. Id. at 32. 
13. Id. at 34. 
14. Id. at 34. 
15. evelyn douek, The Limits of International Law in Content Moderation, 6 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, 
TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 37, 39 (2021). 
16. Id. at 40. 
17. Compare DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE 
INTERNET (2019).  
18. Id. at 41. 
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and Aseem Prakash term “bluewashing.”19 douek summarizes the arguments of 
proponents of the use of international human rights law in social media content 
moderation as follows: IHRL provides an agreed-upon set of global rules, which is 
what is needed in a “borderless internet”;20 it provides a common language for 
discussing issues of content moderation and censorship; 21  it offers a strong 
normative ground from which social media platforms can resist authoritarian 
demands;22 it provides both procedural and substantive standards;23 and, finally, it 
is the “least-worst option.”24 douek nonetheless critiques this approach because of 
the indeterminacies, gaps, inconsistencies, and contestation over the meaning of 
IHRL norms. She contends that the constraints IHRL imposes on social media 
companies are quite limited in practice, providing them with great discretion in 
maintaining that they are complying with it. In addition, she argues, social media 
platforms lack the competence to properly adhere to the procedural requirements 
and engage in the substantive balancing of interests required under IHRL.25 In her 
view, the problems raised by content moderation require shifting from 
individualistic rights to a systemic frame, for which IHRL does not yet provide a 
method because it so far has focused on individual cases.26  
Although she acknowledges the benefit of IHRL’s use as a common language 
to deliberate over the rules governing content moderation, she argues that there is 
need for an institutional structure that facilitates the conversation. Otherwise, there 
is too much reliance on platforms applying IHRL behind closed doors. 27  An 
external, public mechanism could check and contest platforms’ application of IHRL 
in order for IHRL to be applied to platform decision-making on content 
moderation in a more meaningful way.28 
Kyung Sin Park, in his article Data as Public Goods or Private Properties?: A Way 
Out of Conflict Between Data Protection and Free Speech, starts with a comparison of U.S. 
and EU privacy laws and follows the trans-Atlantic genealogy of modern data 
protection laws to Alan Westin’s concept of a property right in which “you own 
data about you.”29 The ownership model is designed to compensate for a market 
 
19. Id. at 40 (citing Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, “Bluewashing” the Firm? Voluntary Regulations, 
Program Design, and Member Compliance with the United Nations Global Compact, 43 POL’Y STUD. J. 115, 132 
(2015)). 
20. Id. at 45–46. 
21. Id. at 46–47. 
22. Id. at 47. 
23. Id. at 47–49. 
24. Id. at 49. 
25. Id. at 59–62. 
26. Id. at 63–65. 
27. Id. at 72. 
28. Id. at 73. 
29. Kyung Sin Park, Data as Public Goods or Private Properties?: A Way Out of Conflict Between Data 
Protection and Free Speech, 6 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 77, 80 (2021). 
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failure in which the data subject is powerless to control and negotiate the terms of 
use of data. It thus creates “a default rule that one cannot collect or control data 
about another without explicit consent to such collection or use” since the data 
belongs to the latter.30 Park contends that this ownership model is not workable or 
desirable in all circumstances. For example, some data, he contends, does not justify 
the ownership model because there is no market failure to be corrected for the 
information that data subjects already deliberately shared with the public without 
any restriction.31 Hence the exemptions in several countries’ data protection laws, 
such as in Europe. In parallel, he notes that U.S. privacy jurisprudence has reduced 
the scope of its “draconian third-party doctrine” that disregarded privacy whenever 
voluntary disclosure was made, opening the possibility for some transnational 
ordering on this issue.32  
Park theorizes the rationale for limiting the ownership model. He argues that 
presuming ownership as a default rule and then allowing for derogations on a case-
by-case basis for publicly available data is too “parsimonious”33 for the following 
reasons. First, data inherently “resist ownership in favor of [either] data subjects or 
in favor of data controllers.”34  Because data is created by a shared interaction 
between the sensed being (the subject of the data) and the sensing being (the 
observer, or the data processor), ownership of that co-created data should be “an 
open question, not a deontological absolute.”35 Second, data is often created for the 
purpose of diffusing knowledge, in which case data ownership should be interpreted 
so as not to favor repose, but sometimes diffusion and repurposing.36 Third, it is 
often unclear who ought to own (or whether any one ought to own) data in the case 
of relationally-created or transactionally-created data. 37  Finally, Park emphasizes an 
element of property ownership favoring transfer, namely that “ownership exists not 
just to prevent use and transfer but to promote use and transfer[.]”38  
Park is concerned that a libertarian, ownership-based conception of data 
protection law will incentivize people to render data unavailable about themselves 
“to the point of rendering research of common benefit to all impossible.”39 In order 
to avoid this “tragedy of data commons,” Park proposes data socialism: “the idea 
that data is one of such essential commodities or infrastructures that need to be left 
to public control, namely public properties.”40  
 
30. Id. at 92. 
31. Id. at 85. 
32. Id. at 88. 
33. Id. at 93. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 94. 
36. Id. at 94–95. 
37. He provides the example of domestic violence offenders where the data of the offender 
was “created relationally” where the victim makes a public accusation. Id. at 95.  
38. Id. at 97. 
39. Id. at 98. 
40. Id. at 99. 
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This symposium addresses the regulation of data, privacy, and speech in a 
world of highly contested norms involving competing priorities over the definition 
of the underlying problems to be addressed. The arenas in which these struggles 
occur are national, regional, and global, involving state and private rulemaking and 
practice, which can engage both international and transnational law. Developments 
in one arena implicate others, generating dynamic processes of transnational legal 
ordering that affect us as individuals and as members of different transnationally 
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